Previous studies have examined the manipulation of executive stock option awards and exercises, focusing on information timing by managers. In this paper, we investigate potential managerial manipulation of stock-price performance motivated by executive stock options. To distinguish performance manipulation from information timing, we examine stock-price performance surrounding the departure of retiring CEOs, whose stock options typically expire shortly after their departure and whose chances to manipulate option awards and exercises are minimized. Consistent with manipulated performance, we find significant abnormal stock returns in the months surrounding CEO departure for those with high option holdings, which are reversed shortly after CEO departure. JEL classification: G30 ; J33 ; M41 ; M52
Introduction
The use of stock options as part of executive compensation has increased dramatically over the past few decades, but the roles of executive stock options remain under debate. It is argued that stock options provide an important incentive scheme for corporate managers and help firms retain key employees. On the other hand, there is an increasing concern among academic and the general public that executive stock options are costly to shareholders, which motivate executives to behave opportunistically. Managerial opportunistic behaviors can be divided into two categories. In the first category, executives opportunistically time stock option awards and exercises; they tend to receive stock option grants before favorable company news announcements (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Bebchuk et al., 2009 ) and chose to exercise options and sell the shares received at favorable times to realize high profitability (e.g., Aboody et al., 2008; Cicero, 2009) . Such opportunistic behaviors are related to executives' private information and hence can be referred to as information timing.
In the second category, executives manipulate corporate performance; by taking actions to temporarily elevate the company's stock price, executives maximize capital gains from exercising stock options at high share prices. Unlike information timing, such opportunistic behavior induces managers to directly manipulate corporate decisions to influence the share value in the short term. Our study focuses on this type of executive opportunistic behavior. We document direct evidence on manipulated stock-price performance motivated by executive stock option exercises.
Prior studies have identified a link between manipulated corporate decisions and executive stock options. For instance, Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006) document that managers with more option and stock holdings are more likely to manipulate reported earnings through discretionary accruals; Efendi et al. (2007) observe higher likelihood of a misstated financial statement when the CEO has sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options; Aboody and Kasznik (2000) study scheduled option grants and find that managers time their voluntary disclosures by accelerating bad news and delaying good news around the option grant date.
These studies suggest that stock options motivate executives to manipulate corporate performance. Without direct evidence on manipulated stock returns, however, these studies do not answer important questions such as: Can executives effectively manipulate stock price (or is there significant evidence of manipulated stock returns)? If the answer is yes, then can executives acquire economically significant benefit from manipulated stock-price performance?
We address these issues in a unique setting: we examine stock-price performance for a sample of firms in the years surrounding CEO retirement. We consider a CEO departure as normal retirement if the CEO leaves office at age 64 or above. By dividing such CEOs into two groups, one with high option holdings and the other with low option holdings, we compare stock abnormal returns between the two groups.
Our empirical strategy is based on the following considerations. As our data will show, retiring CEOs often have sizable option holdings and exercise unusually more options in their final year in office than in previous years. Because any unexercised stock options will lapse soon upon retirement, 1 we expect retiring CEOs to have strongest option incentives, for which any option-induced behaviors should be most evident with such CEOs. In particular, since any 1 Firms usually allow a post-retirement period of 60 to 90 days for option exercises. In recent years, some firms such as Disney have further extended the time for post-retirement option exercises. For nonretirement departures, firms often specify that stock options terminate on the last day of employment (e.g., Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.).
performance effect of option-motivated decisions by an outgoing manager must necessarily show up in the years surrounding his departure, there is a clear performance window that allows us to trace the role of his option holdings. This is a distinct advantage of our approach because it is usually difficult to identify a clear performance window for non-retirement CEOs.
Restrictions on vesting and exercising stock options dictate the long-term nature of option incentives, for which managerial behaviors change with complex time-varying structures of unexercised options and expiration dates that are not observed by the public. Hence, for nonretiring CEOs, there is no simple link between a given year's performance and their option status in that year or certain early years. In addition, this unique performance window allows us to identify the effect of performance manipulation without being concerned with information timing. For normal retirement, the CEO's departure is typically pre-determined and the timing is difficult to manipulate shortly, or even months, before the departure. Therefore, with little chance for the outgoing CEO to engage in information timing, he can only manipulate the share price to maximize his capital gains from option exercises.
We divide our sample of retiring CEOs into high-option holding and low-option holding groups based on their unexercised options at the time one year before their departure. After matching for size and book-to-market ratio between the two groups, we compare their industryadjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the three-year period from one year before and until two years after CEO departure. We find an inverted V-shape of the difference in BHAR between the two groups: the abnormal return is higher for the high-option group than for the low-option group, and the difference peaks in the month of CEO departure at a rate of 12-16%. After CEO departure, the difference diminishes and gradually disappears.
This finding indicates a temporary positive effect of executive stock options on stock price that is reversed shortly after the CEO leaves office. This price pattern coincides with the phenomenon that CEOs exercise unusually more options in their final year in office. Our finding can not be explained by firm heterogeneity, CEO heterogeneity, or any market related variables. We view this finding as evidence of manipulated stock-price performance that helps the retiring CEO maximize capital gains from option exercises. The resulting economic benefit that can be captured by the CEO is economically significant. Under the assumption that half of the CEO's all exercisable options in the final year are exercised, the abnormal capital gains to the retiring CEO is on average $2 million.
The revision of stock price in the post-CEO turnover period is a strong indication of performance manipulation. We then examine corporate decisions in the years surrounding CEO retirement, including accruals, R&D expenditure, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and repurchases that may directly affect the share price. Consistent with option-induced performance manipulation, we find that before CEO departure, the high-option group is less likely to conduct a SEO and, with weaker evidence, more likely to buy back shares.
Apparently, both decision preferences are associated an immediate upward effect on the stock price, which help the retiring manager exit from his option position. On the other hand, consistent with previous studies regarding horizon problems facing retiring CEOs, we do not find evidence of option-induced earnings management or reduced R&D expenditure in the final years.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature and the research strategy of our study. Section 3 discusses the data we use in our examination. Section 4 presents our main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Background and Research Method

Related Literature
Stock options have become increasingly important in executive compensation contracts. In terms of the Black-Sholes value of stock options, some researchers argue that executive stock options have become predominant in providing managerial incentives (see Hall, B., and J. Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 1998) . A number of studies conducted by financial economists, law economists and accountants have examined various issues regarding executive stock options.
These issues can be divided into two broad lines of research that address two important research questions: How are executive stock options awarded? Do executive stock options affect firm performance?
The first question is the main concern of relatively early studies. By examining determinants of option grants to CEOs, Yermack (1995) finds little evidence that option grants follow optimal compensation practices suggested by theory. He concludes that cross-sectional variations in option grants are not well explained by agency theory or financial contract theory.
More recently, Hall and Murphy (2003) explore problems with the wide use of executive stock options. They argue that options are often an inefficient way to attract and motivate executives, and that options are overly used because boards and managers falsely perceive stock options to be inexpensive. Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) document evidence of a dating game that entails picking a grant date after the board's compensation decision is made. Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that CEOs receive an abnormally high number of "lucky" grants that are awarded at the lowest price of the grant month.
Other studies in this line examine the link between stock option awards and corporate decisions. Yermack (1997) These findings are consistent with Bartov and Mohanram (2004) and Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006) , who identify a link between option exercises and earnings management. This literature suggests two possibilities: managers possess private information and accordingly "passively" time option awards and exercises, or they "actively" manipulate share price via earnings management, to maximize their private benefits. These two possibilities imply different causal relations regarding the option scheme. The first possibility points to managers' opportunistic timing behavior, but it has no implication for any potential performance effect of stock options. The second possibility suggests a role of stock options in motivating executives to directly manipulate corporate performance. However, those studies do not document the performance effect of executive stock options. Indeed, it is difficult to do so because of the long-term nature of option incentives and intertemporal variation in stock option awards and vesting process; there is no simple link between option grants or holdings at one time and a subsequent option exercise at another time. Therefore, these studies do not answer whether executives can effectively manipulate stock-price performance and whether they can obtain economically significant benefits from such manipulated performance.
Research Method
To estimate the performance effect of executive stock options, we examine stock-price performance for a sample of firms with a retiring CEO, who, by our definition, left office at age 64 or above during the sample period. We divide such CEOs into two groups, one with high option holdings and the other with low option holdings, and after controlling for market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio, we compare industry-adjusted abnormal stock returns between the two groups for the one year before and two years after CEO departure.
Our study has distinct features in contrast to previous studies on the effects of executive stock options. Third and last, by examining the decisions made by retiring CEOs, we may identify the types of corporate decision that are likely to be option-induced and that are likely to cause a performance effect. Such examination is related to the horizon problem discussed in the literature. Theory suggests that managers close to retirement are associated with stronger compensation and equity incentives (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Easton and Rosen, 1983 ).
The evidence is so far mixed on managerial decisions facing a horizon problem, such as earnings management and R&D expenditures (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1992; Naveen, 2006) . We extend this literature by also examining corporate decisions on SEOs and repurchases.
Data and Sample
Our sample is based on the dataset of Standard & Poor's ExecuComp. This dataset provides detailed information, beginning in 1992, on executive stock options, as well as on executive direct pay and turnover, for top executives in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 firms. Because we need to examine the firm's performance in the years surrounding a CEO change, we require the CEO in our sample to be with his firm for at least two years before his departure and the firm must have at least two yeas' data after the departure. We therefore confine our data to the period of 1994-2002. We obtain various firm financial data from Standard & Poor's Compustat dataset and stock-price performance data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data tape. In addition, we also need the information on corporate decisions in the years surrounding a CEO change, which we obtain from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database.
After eliminating CEOs without the information on age and departure time, our total sample consists of 1,337 CEO turnover events. We further identify normal retirement-based departures, which are our main concern. Following previous studies (e.g., Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) , we consider a departure as normal retirement if the CEO was 64 or older when he left office. The resulting subsample includes 402 retiring CEOs. Table 1 performance, the option effects should be strongest for those who are close to retirement and who still hold many options. Table 2 present further statistics regarding outgoing CEOs' option positions in their final years, in which we divide retiring CEOs, and non-retiring CEOs separately, into high and low option holding groups, based on their final year holdings, at the median level. As expected, retiring CEOs of the high-option holding group receive fewer and fewer options as they approach retirements, and the amount of options they exercise in the final year equals the total amount they exercise in previous three years. Retiring CEOs of the lowoption group do not show any notable regularity, who, in all years, are with very low levels of option awards, exercises, and holdings.
For non-retiring CEOs, the high-option group shows some interesting differences from the retiring counterpart. CEOs of this group receive large option awards every year until the final year when the awards drop from the previous year's 0.44% to the final year's 0.16%, which appears to suggest some unexpected change that suddenly reduces option grants. In addition, these CEOs' unexercised unexercisable options remain as high as 75-83% in previous years until the final year when it drops to 0.31%. This drop cannot be directly explained by the final year's option numbers. These observations appear to indicate irregularities in option holdings or policy for CEOs who leave for reasons other than normal retirement.
Main Empirical Results
In the finance literature, different approaches are used to examine long-run stock-price performance, among which matching-sample comparison is common (Barber and Lyon, 1997) .
In this study, we also use a matching-sample approach to examine the effect of executive stock options on stock returns. In this approach, we divide the total sample into two groups at the median level of CEO option holdings, and after matching for firm characteristics, we compare stock abnormal returns between the two groups.
Our first step is to divide the total sample into two groups of firms with different CEO option holdings. As a CEO approaches retirement, the pressure from unexercised stock options increases and his option incentives are expect to be strongest in his final year in office. This point finds evidence in Table 2 , where we show that, in the final year, CEOs exercise more than double as many options as they do in the early years. As the final year should highlight option-induced managerial behaviors, we divide the sample based on CEOs' option holdings one year before they leave office. We first identify the date of each CEO turnover (which we denote as t=0) and determine the CEO's option holding 12 months before this date (which we denote as t=-1), and then divide the total sample according to this option level. CEOs with option holdings higher than the sample median are in the high-option holding group, and others are in the low-option holding group whom we treat as control CEOs.
The next step is to match the two groups by firm characteristics. As usual, we perform oneto-one match by size (market capitalization) and growth (book-to-market ratio). We first match the two groups by size; for each firm in the high-option holding group, we obtain one matching firm in the low-option holding group. The matching firm's size must be in the range of 0.7 to 1.3 times of the high-option counterpart and should be the closest. In the matching, each observation is used only once. This single-dimension matching results in 464 pairs of sizematched firms. We then further match these firms by book-to-market ratio. We also require the matching firm's book-to-market ratio be in the range of 0.7 to 1.3 times of, and be closest to, the high-option counterpart. The two-dimension matching procedure yields 431 pairs of sizeand book-to-market matched firms.
Since retiring CEOs are the main focus of our study, we separately divide such CEOs into high-and low-option holding groups based on their unexercised options at the time 12 months before their departure. In a similar approach, we match the two groups by size and book-tomarket ratio, which leads to 147 pairs of size-matched retiring CEOs and 135 pairs of size-and book-to-market matched retiring CEOs.
The effect of executive stock options on performance
The control firms are expected to capture firm heterogeneity and any abnormal changes in firm value associated with CEO turnover events (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) . However, because we do not match for the date of CEO change, which is essentially infeasible, we further remove market-related effects by adjusting for industry returns. Therefore, we use as the performance measure the firm's buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) over the three-year period from 12 months before CEO change and until 24 months after. The performance measure is calculated as:
where, t denotes month relative to CEO turnover, RET i t is firm i's stock return in month t, and
RET Industry t
is the equal-weighted industry (based on the two-digit SIC code) average return in month t. For a stock and its matching counterpart to be included in the calculation, we require their return data to be available for at least one year before and one year after the turnover month. Table 3 presents our main results for the performance effect of executive stock options, in which we test for the difference in BHAR between the high-and low-option holding firms surrounding the retiring CEO's departure. For comparison purposes, we perform the test both with the unmatched sample and with the two matched samples. Panel A, B, and C present the results for the unmatched sample, the size-matched sample, and the size-and book-to-market matched sample, respectively. In each panel, we report the two groups' BHAR and their difference every three months for the three-year period surrounding CEO departure.
The results are similar and quite consistent between the three panels except that the results are weaker in Panel C, perhaps, due to the relatively small sample size. For the high-option holding group, BHAR is mostly positive and the highest level of 12-16% occurs in the month of CEO departure. On the other hand, BHAR is negative for all time intervals for the lowoption holding group, and it reaches the lowest level a few months after CEO departure. The negative abnormal returns apparently reflect increased uncertainty of the sample firms due to CEO change (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) , which is most serious during the several months surrounding CEO departure. This CEO-change effect is picked up by the control group.
Our key observation is that all panels indicate an inverted V-shape of the difference in BHAR between the high-and low-option holding groups. While the abnormal return is higher for the high-option holding group, the difference peaks and becomes significant only in the few months before and surrounding CEO departure; after that, the difference diminishes and essentially disappears in about one year. Figures 2 to 4 further depict this result, which shows graphically the striking difference in the abnormal returns between the two groups.
Taking the difference as a result of executive stock options, we obtain a clear and strong implication from this finding: There is a temporary positive effect of executive stock options on the share value, and this effect is reversed soon after the CEO leaves office. This effect coincides with the observation that CEOs exercise significantly more options in their final year in office, and indicates strongly manipulated stock-price performance that helps the retiring CEO maximize capital gains from exercising stock options. The resulting economic benefit is also economically significant. Under the assumption that half of the CEO's all unexercised exercisable options in the final year (which is averaged at 0.44%) are exercised, the abnormal capital gains to the retiring CEO is on average $2 million.
On the other hand, our results do not show a sustained impact on the firm's value and hence executive stock options do not seem to meaningfully benefit shareholders. Clearly, this observation does not support a presumed important role of stock options in improving executive working incentives. Even though options do play a role in enhancing incentives, this role, at least in our setting, is either negligible or insignificant relative to the manipulation effect. This point has interesting implications to managerial incentive contracts. In theory, explicit incentives from executive compensation must be strongest for managers close to retirement because of their weakest career concern (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) . However, when the managers approaching retirement are motivated to manipulate short-term share price instead of working harder to promote shareholder value, then the increasingly important component of executive compensation, stock options, may not work in the way financial economists predict.
Our finding of the performance reversion in the post-CEO turnover period is particularly interesting. First, it is a direct and strong indication of share price manipulation. Many previous studies have examined the opportunistic behavior of managers in which they time option grants and exercises for anticipated corporate news (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Hanlon et al. 2002; Ittner et al. 2002) . In such a case, the firm's fundamental value is bound to increase for anticipated good news and to decline for anticipated bad news, and there is no reason for the stock price to be revised unless the news is fabricated (which is a result of manipulation). In other words, while managerial opportunistic behaviors involve reversed causality, in which it is the anticipated stock price change that determines the executive's dealing with stock options, they do not lead to performance revision. On the other hand, manipulation is not private-news based and does not reflect the firm's fundamentals. By nature of manipulation, any manipulated stock price would necessarily come back no matter whether the manipulation is though corporate news release or by timing corporate decisions. In other words, manipulation is a necessary condition for performance revision and it involves no reversed causality.
Second, the price-revision phenomenon reinforces our notion that the results are not driven by firm heterogeneity or any market related factors. In the presence of firm heterogeneity, there would be a persistent difference between the high-and low-option holding groups and hence we should not observe price revision. For market related factors, while they may cause certain differences between the two groups, these differences should be irregular and should occur at irregular times. Again, there is no reason for the price to be revised and for the revision to occur immediately after the CEO leaves office. Table 4 presents the same test with the total sample of all outgoing (retiring and nonretiring) CEOs. In this test, the difference in BHAR between the two groups is reversed; the abnormal return is generally lower for the high-option holding group. However, with the exception of one observation that is marginally significant, all differences are insignificant.
Noting that non-retiring CEOs are the majority who account for 70 percent of the total sample, this result is not surprising. When the CEO is changed for reasons other than normal retirement, it is mostly in one of the following situations: poor health (including sudden death), poor performance, and voluntary leave for greener pasture. Without a predetermined timetable for terminal employment, non-retiring CEOs in all situations either, ex ante, do not have a plan to leave or, after the firm decides to change the CEO, are no longer in a position to effectively manipulate corporate decisions. Therefore, the results in Table 4 are not unexpected and do not conflict with the finding obtained in Table 3 .
An implication from Table 4 is that the pattern of the difference in BHAR between the high-and low-option holding groups we report in Table 3 Table 3 and Table 4 . Should executive heterogeneity be the driving factor, this factor would have dictated the results for retiring CEOs and non-retiring
CEOs alike, and hence we would have observed similar patterns of abnormal returns in both tables, except that the test in Table 4 would even be stronger because of the much larger sample size.
To further understand our results, we also examine the stock-price performance with respect to retiring CEOs' stock ownership. Unlike options, the CEO's ownership is determined by his investment strategy in managing his personal wealth, which is not constrained by any terminal period conditions. With the same strategy as we use for stock options, we divide the total sample into high-and low-stock ownership groups, match the two groups by market capitalization and book-to-market ratio, and then compare the industry adjusted abnormal returns between the two groups. As expected, our results from this examination (which are not reported) indicate no meaningful difference in stock-price performance between the two groups. This examination further confirms that our finding discussed above is driven by executive stock options.
The effect of stock options on managerial decisions
As we have established the performance effect of stock options, we now examine corporate decisions in the year before the CEO leaves office. If the performance effect indeed comes from manipulation by the outgoing manager, there must be a link between his option position and certain corporate decisions in the final year that coincides with the pattern of abnormal returns documented in Table 3 .
In this examination, we consider four decision variables that are possible manipulative vehicles managers can use to influence the firm's stock price in the short run: earnings management, R&D expenses, share repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs where TACCRUAL i,t is firm i's total accrual in the current year, A i,t-1 is last year's total assets, ΔREV i,t is the change of net revenue from last year, PPE i,t is the current-year gross property, plant and equipment, and ROA i,t-1 is last year's return on total assets. The residual of this crosssectional regression model is our estimate of discretionary accruals.
The first two panels of Table 5 is the fiscal year when the CEO is changed. In all years and with all samples, there is statistically no difference in the two accrual statistics between the high-and low-option holding groups. We are interested in the years t = -1 and 0, in which the outgoing CEO can influence the earnings statement. The difference for these two years is also insignificant, with the sign in the unexpected direction. Therefore, this test does not support option-induced earnings management by retiring CEOs.
Some previous studies have also examined CEO's pre-retirement years, and mostly found no evidence for earnings management (e.g., Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) . Our test is consistent with this literature, and it further shows that options do not alter such CEOs' decisions in this regard. This result is not surprising. As Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) put it, "managerial discretion over accruals in any given year period is limited in part by the incomeinflating decisions exercised in prior years." For retiring CEOs, even if they have an incentive to inflate earnings, it is possible that they are no longer in a position to do it effectively or freely because of the apparent concern that any inflated earnings by the outgoing CEO in the final year pose a direct burden to the successor.
Panel C presents the test for annual R&D spending scaled by total sales. The results from the unmatched sample and the size-matched sample indicate higher R&D expenditures for the high-option holding group, which is unexpected. However, when the two groups are also matched by market-to-book ratio, this difference disappears. The difference is statistically insignificant in all years and with all subsamples. Therefore, our test does not show R&D expenditure manipulation associated with executive stock options. Because cutting R&D expenditure may hamper the firm's strategic development that has already been in place, the concern from potential successors, who are mostly insider executives, may well limit the manipulation in this dimension by the outgoing CEO. Table 6 presents our comparison for SEOs and share repurchases between the two groups, in which we calculate the number of SEO and repurchase events during the four year period surrounding (two years before and two years after) CEO turnover. In the upper panel, the frequency of SEOs shows a pattern consistent with the effort of the high-option group in price support. This pattern is more evident with the size-and book-to-market matched sample. In the 12 month one year before CEO departure, ten firms in the low-option group conduct a SEO while only five in the high-option group do so. This difference suggests that CEOs with more options tend to avoid issuing new equity in order to minimize downward pressures on the stock price. In the 12 months before CEO departure, the frequency of SEOs becomes similar between the two groups. Noting that the high-option group has high abnormal returns in this period (which encourage new equity issuing), this observation is also consistent with the outgoing CEO's influence in supporting the stock price.
On the other hand, in the two years after the new CEO is in control, the difference in the SEO frequency between the two groups is reversed: while it increases with the high option group, it declines dramatically with the low option group. Consequently, the high option group conducted many more SEOs than the low option group in the two years immediately after the new CEO takes the office. This reversed difference appears to reflect compensating SEOs by the new CEO for the "skipped" SEOs in the previous two years.
The lower panel presents our comparison for share repurchases. Consistent with the result from SEOs, the difference in the number of repurchases between the two groups also indicate price support from the high-option holding group. Consider the size and book-to-market matched sample. In the 12 month one year before CEO departure, 24 repurchases were conducted by firms in the high-option group and 19 were conducted by firms in the low-option group. This difference is reversed after CEO departure; in the 12 months before CEO departure, while the number of repurchases jumps to 26 for the low-option group, it slightly drops to 22 for the high-option group.
We further run regressions to test for the stock option effects on SEOs and share repurchases. Table 7 reports the results for our test for SEOs. The first six columns present probit regressions, where the dependent variable equals one if one or more SEOs are conducted in the specified period before CEO turnover and equals zero otherwise. The coefficient on the dummy variable for the high-option holding group captures the option effect. Market capitalization, stock return performance, and debt ratio are included as the controls. Consistent with the observation from the statistics in Table 6 , the coefficient on the dummy variable is negative in all regressions, and becomes statistically marginally significant with the subsample matched for size and book-to-market.
The remaining three columns present OLS regressions for the change in the number of SEOs from the two-year period before CEO turnover to the two-year period after CEO turnover. The control variables in these regressions are in difference, calculated as the corresponding change from the pre-turnover period to the post-turnover period. The economic rationale for these regressions is the following: if fewer SEOs in the two-year period before CEO change are due to the outgoing CEO's manipulation, we expect some compensating actions by the new CEO to raise more equity capital in the post-CEO change period. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on the high-option holding dummy to be positive. Consistent with this expectation, the coefficient is positive and statistically highly significant in all three regressions.
These three regressions are essentially a difference-in-differences test, which provide a robust estimation uncontaminated by potential firm heterogeneity. We consider the finding from this test to be strong evidence of SEO manipulation by the outgoing CEO, motivated by executive stock options. Consistent with the statistics from Table 6 , the coefficient on the high-option dummy is positive in the first six regressions. However, except in one regression, the coefficient is insignificant. In the remaining regressions, the difference-in-differences test identifies no meaningful difference in the coefficient between the high-and low-option holding groups. Therefore, our evidence does not indicate any compensating decisions by the new CEO in conducting share repurchases.
Conclusion
By examining stock-price performance for a sample of firms with the retiring CEO, we document evidence of manipulated stock returns motivated by executive stock options. In our examination, we divide retiring CEOs into high-and low-option holding groups and, after matching for firm characteristics and adjusting for industry returns, compare stock-price performance in three years surrounding (one year before and two years after) CEO departure.
We find positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the high-option holding group relative to the low-option holding group in the year before CEO departure. However, shortly after the CEO leaves office, the abnormal returns turn negative and essentially disappear in one to two years after the CEO's departure.
This inverted V-shape abnormal returns with the high-option holding group coincides with the timing of CEO replacement, which cannot be explained by firm heterogeneity, CEO heterogeneity, or any market related variables. We interpret this finding as evidence of optioninduced manipulation of stock price by the outgoing CEO. Consistent with this interpretation, we document evidence of corporate decisions made by the outgoing CEO in the one to two years before his departure that help support stock price. We find that firms in the high-option holding group are less likely to raise equity capital and more likely to conduct share repurchases.
Previous studies have examined the link between manipulated corporate decisions and executive stock options, and more recent studies have documented executive opportunistic behaviors associated with stock options. Contributing to the growing literature, we present the first direct evidence on manipulated stock-price performance motivated by executive stock options. Our results indicate that executives can affectively manipulate stock price and, by exercising options at high share prices, realize economically significant abnormal returns.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
We obtain corporate executive data from Standard & Poor's ExecuComp and company financial data from COMPUSTAT. After eliminating observations with missing data, our sample consists of 1,337 CEO turnovers for the period 1994-2002. We divide CEO departure events into two categories: normal retirement and others. A CEO departure is considered to be normal retirement if the outgoing CEO is 64 or older in the year of CEO turnover. This table presents summary statistics for selected CEO and firm variables for retiring CEOs and non-retiring CEOs, separately. All variables are reported for the fiscal year of CEO change. Grants and exercises of stock options are reported as the percentage of firm's total shares outstanding. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm's common stock plus the book value of debt over the firm's book value of total assets. Table 2 Option awards, exercises, and holdings of outgoing CEOs
This table reports mean option grants, exercises and holdings of outgoing CEOs for the four years before CEO turnover. The sample is described in Table 1 . All option variables are reported as the percentage of total shares outstanding at the fiscal year end. Panel A presents the statistics for the subsample of 402 retiring CEOs, and Panel B for the subsample of 935 non-retiring CEOs. In both panels, CEOs are further divided into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings at the year end before the turnover year (t = -1). Hence, in each panel, the high (low) option holding group consists of observations with CEO option holding above (below) the median. Table 3 Stock-Price Performance: Retiring CEOs
This table presents the test for stock-price performance for retiring CEOs in the three year period surrounding (one year before and two years after) CEO departure. The sample of retiring CEOs is described in Table 1 . Retiring CEOs are divided into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. The high (low) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Then, firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size and market-to-book ratio. The unmatched sample consists of 192 pairs of observations, the size-matched sample consists of 147 pairs of observations, and the size and market-to-book matched sample consists of 135 pairs of observations. We measure stock-price performance using industry-adjusted buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR). Beginning from 12 months prior to CEO departure, we calculate BHAR for every three months for each group. The difference in BHAR between the two groups and the t-statistic are reported. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Table 4 Stock-Price Performance: All CEOs
This table presents the test for stock-price performance for all retiring and non-retiring CEOs in the three year period surrounding (one year before and two years after) CEO departure. The sample is described in Table 1 . CEOs are divided into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. The high (low) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Then, firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size and market-to-book ratio. The unmatched sample consists of 622 pairs of observations, the size-matched sample consists of 464 pairs of observations, and the size and market-to-book matched sample consists of 431 pairs of observations. We measure stock-price performance using industry-adjusted buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR). Beginning from 12 months prior to CEO departure, we calculate BHAR for every three months for each group. The difference in BHAR between the two groups and the t-statistic are reported. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This table presents the test for annual accruals and R&D expenditure for firms with a retiring CEO in the two fiscal years before (t = -1 and 0) and two fiscal years after (t =1 and 2) CEO turnover, with Panel A for total accruals, Panel B for discretionary accruals, and Panel C for R&D expenditure. The sample of retiring CEOs is described in Table 1 . CEOs are divided into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. The high (low) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Then, firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size and market-to-book ratio. The unmatched sample consists of 192 pairs of observations, the size-matched sample consists of 147 pairs of observations, and the size and market-to-book matched sample consists of 135 pairs of observations. Total accruals are calculated as income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows scaled by year-beginning total assets. Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from regression model (2). R&D expenditure is annual R&D expenses scaled by total sales. t-statistic for the difference between the high-and low-option holding groups is reported. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Table 6 SEOs and Repurchases Surrounding CEO Retirement: Summary Statistics Table 7 Regressions for SEOs Surrounding CEO Retirement
This table presents the regressions for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the years surrounding CEO retirement. The sample of retiring CEOs is described in Table 1 . CEOs are divided into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. The high (low) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Their firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size or style (i.e., size and market-to-book ratio). The information on SEOs is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The first six columns present probit regressions, where the dependent variable equals one if one or more SEOs are conducted in the specified period before CEO turnover and equals zero otherwise. Market capitalization, stock return, and debt ratio are annual data for the year one year before the turnover year. The remaining three columns present OLS regressions for the change in the number of SEOs from the two-year period before CEO turnover to the two-year period after CEO turnover. Market capitalization, stock return, and debt ratio are in difference, calculated as the corresponding change from the pre-turnover period to the post-turnover period. t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This table presents the regressions for repurchases in the years surrounding CEO retirement. The sample of retiring CEOs is described in Table 1 . CEOs are divided into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. The high (low) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Their firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size or style (i.e., size and market-tobook ratio). The information on stock repurchases is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The first six columns present probit regressions, where the dependent variable equals one if one or more repurchases are conducted in the specified period before CEO turnover and equals zero otherwise. Market capitalization, stock return, and debt ratio are annual data for the year one year before the turnover year. The remaining three columns present OLS regressions for the change in the number of repurchases from the two-year period before CEO turnover to the two-year period after CEO turnover. Market capitalization, stock return, and debt ratio are in difference, calculated as the corresponding change from the pre-turnover period to the post-turnover period. t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This figure shows stock-price performance for the unmatched sample of retiring CEOs in the three year period surrounding (one year before and two years after) CEO departure. Retiring CEOs are those who leave office at age 64 or above. The sample consists of 384 CEOs, who are divided into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months prior to their departure. The high (low) option holding group includes CEOs with option holdings above (below) the median. We measure stock-price performance by industry-adjusted buyand-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) beginning from 12 months before CEO departure. The upper panel shows BHAR for the high-and low-option holding groups separately. The lower panel shows the difference in BHAR between the two groups. This figure shows stock-price performance for the size-matched sample of retiring CEOs in the three year period surrounding (one year before and two years after) CEO departure. Retiring CEOs are those who leave office at age 64 or above. We divide CEOs into high-and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months prior to their departure. The high (low) option holding group thus consists of CEOs with option holdings above (below) the median. We then match firms between the two groups by market capitalization. The resulting sample consists of 147 pairs of size-matched firms. We measure stock-price performance by industry-adjusted buy-andhold-abnormal return (BHAR) beginning from 12 months before CEO departure. The upper panel shows BHAR for the high-and low-option holding group separately. The lower panel shows the difference in BHAR between the two groups. 
